Stab in the Back

In 1918, German military leaders recognized that continued fighting could lead to the collapse of their forces with extraordinary negative results on the nation. The determination to sue for peace was made and an Armistice ending the fighting in The Great War was signed with the allies.

This turn of events was a shock to the German people who had been supportive of the war and, seeing their army still occupying significant territory of enemy nations, were led to believe that high level treachery was responsible for the humiliating end to hostilities. Thus was born the `Stab-in-the-Back’ theory whereby their valiant soldiers, after glory in the East, were sold out when victory in the West was still possible.

Our commander in Europe, General John Pershing, was prescient in seeing the Armistice as a likely failure without a clear demonstration to the German people that their military had been defeated in the field of battle. He was overruled in his recommendation that the fighting continue.

Attempts at democratic government in Germany after World War I failed due to the horrible peace treaty ending the war and the terrible economic depression that was felt across the globe. Adolph Hitler cleverly exploited the armistice, the Treaty of Versailles, the bad times, and – as much as the other reasons – the `Stab-in-the-Back’ to achieve political power and begin his quest to control Europe.

Since World War II, the U.S. has fought many wars in which the goals were less than the complete conquest of those fighting on the other side. Many Americans who had come to understand the nature of the power the nation had developed and acquired as a result of our involvement on the war and our growing economic might were appalled by the limited goals set out by our leaders in the new age.

The Korean War led to one of the great internal conflicts and tests of our Constitutional institutions. General Douglas MacArthur, representing a very popular strain in the body politic, went public with a demand for far more than just a stalemate on the peninsula. The conflict boiled over when President Truman relieved the general of command. The brouhaha that followed included a strain of the earlier `Stab-in-the-Back’ argument raised in Germany. President Truman became for a time one of our most despised presidents and chose not to run for reelection based on the likelihood that he would lose.

The `Stab-in-the-Back’ argument did not fit the situation in Vietnam nearly so well. Despite sending significant forces to the war, stalemate was never achieved, and it was likely that far greater force would have to be applied if a real victory or even the appearance of one were to be achieved. By the time the conflict reached its final stages, there was a growing consensus in the population that the war could not be won within the limits of sacrifice the nation was willing to undergo. Besides, after long fighting, many of the original supporters of the war had become its opponents.

But, as pointed out most clearly by Andrew Bacevich in his recent book, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, the neoconservatives, the Christian Evangelical right, and a body of military intellectuals seized upon the low point of Vietnam to make an argument that can easily be construed to have more than a passing resemblance to the `Stab-in-the-Back’ of old, and the resurrection of military power was a clear result of their push.

Over the next generation the coalition on the right capitalized on such arguments to advance itself politically to achieve substantial control over the federal government. By the time of our attack on Iraq, It captured both Houses of Congress and the presidency.

I’ll skip the arguments of whether we should have attacked Iraq. My position that the war represented a preventive rather than preemptive attack and should never have taken place is known to my readers.

We are in Iraq with all of its broken crockery. We’re backing a process that may lead to a national government that will be accepted by the various ethnic and religious elements to the point that it may hold together. The President as Commander-in-Chief has stated that we will stay until he is certain that the government of Iraq reaches that point. Such an outcome over the next four years would be the best possible result.

Sadly, the seed has been planted that if the U.S. is not willing to stay the present course in Iraq we will betray our troops and their sacrifices. This, of course, sets up a national referendum for the 2008 election cycle in which the voters will have to choose between prematurely bringing home the troops or by continuing the adventure into the indefinite future. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said that defeating the insurgency could take up to twelve years.

At this point, the far left, the Democratic Party, and most independents see such an election contest as a positive thing. They see a change in the party controlling the White House and the probable capture of one House of Congress between now and then as great outcomes. Absent startling change in the situation, unless I die or am incapacitated, I will be voting for this outcome. (Please no laughing if I don’t make it.)

But this will not be the end. Nothing ever ends in politics and the seeds of disaffection have already been sown. Failure to stay the course is tantamount to a `Stab-in-the-Back’ for the troops who have sacrificed so much for us. The pendulum that is clearly swinging in the direction of those with a realistic outlook of foreign policy could move back the other way in the blink of an eye.

Blog on!

Wild Bill