In his wonderful book, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced By War, Andrew Bacevich shows that the making of American Defense policy has been snatched from professional military officers (and even their civilian leadership) and gathered into the clutches of high priests of policy from a small number of elite institutions such as the Rand Corporation, The American Enterprise Institute, The Brookings Institution, and a very small number of elite universities. In reading the book and observing what has happened during the presidential administrations since WW II, I am convinced that Bacevich has it right.
Administrations change and one set of military intellectuals takes over as those formerly in power scramble for fellowships and tenured vacancies in Cambridge, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago and Palo Alto. With the appointment of Robert S. McNamara to the head of DOD a new trend line was established; no longer could old time amateurs line up for appointments at the Pentagon. The days were over for the likes of Charlie Wilson of, “What’s good for General Motors is good for America,” fame, and the beginnings of Bacevich’s priesthood can be seen – with discursions for highly qualified old bulls from Congress such as Melvin Laird and Les Aspin.
More than that, however, prior to the Cold War, creating foreign policy was the responsibility of the U.S. Department of State. The Foreign Service – the professional corps of the department - was the principal source of intelligence and American policy direction. When times were good, the secretary - usually highly qualified semi-pros such as Dean Acheson or Christian Herter - was the key figure in establishing policy. Under darkening war clouds and strong presidents, the White House became the center of our relations with other powers with the diminished secretary acting as a coordinator.
But as the Cold War heated, information and communication technology was revolutionized, and the priesthood sponsored by the military industrial complex became ascendant. During the period roughly encompassing the presidencies from Kennedy through Reagan, the making of foreign policy shifted inexorably from the Foggy Bottom to the Pentagon. Again, the intellectual horsepower of the presidents and luminary Secretaries of State such as Henry Kissinger clouded the situation, and it is only in retrospect that the diminution of the professionals at the State Department becomes obvious despite having more titled Career Ambassadors than ever walking around Virginia Avenue. More and more those in the front office of the State Department were able to deal directly with foreign leaders without the need for information historically supplied by professionals.
Some time between WW II and the middle of the Cold War, professional diplomatic stars such as Robert Murphy, and George Kennan passed from the service - never to be replaced at the professional level - and were supplanted by the nearly invisible thinkers from the institutions shown above. All the while, the information provided by the CIA, DIA, NSA and elsewhere in the now vast federal system flowed away from Foreign Service and military professionals – also despite more generals and admirals than ever - to the front offices of Defense and State and to the White House with it’s souped up national security staff.
As with the downward slide of Foreign Service luminaries, generals and admirals declined in visibility. During and after WWII generals with brains could have panache as well. Four stars such as Maxwell Taylor and even three star Jim Gavin were celebrities. No more; generals and top Foreign Service officers recite the news according to text supplied in Washington when they get on TV and editorialize at their peril.
But if the executive has been captured by representatives of the military industrial complex, Congress has suffered even greater decline. In Iraq, it took strong – and secure – senators and representatives to stand against information that in retrospect was highly flawed but which was pushed by the full weight of the executive and its external claque.
In reviewing our time in Vietnam, it is interesting to read the history of that war’s near declaration, The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and see a document at least as badly flawed as the document that sent our troops into Iraq. It is also educational to see how the Congress, then Democrat led, was no match for the White House in that tragedy as well. And look where that led us to as a nation.
Now we are spectators as right wingers scare the hell out of us with regard to the failure of the bureaucrats – military and civilians – to do their jobs in getting the dangers posed by Iran to the hands of policy makers so that they can defend the American people.
There is only one answer as far as the neocon priests presently in charge: apply American power.
If our representatives on Capitol Hill can’t or won’t provide oversight in the process of life and death for the nation, the future is bleak indeed. A Congress that is unable to do anything but rubber stamp what the president says is no legislature at all, and the Constitution itself is badly wounded. Unified government during Vietnam and now in Iraq failed the country. The Democrats failed us in the sixties and the Republicans are leading us to ruin now. Divided government is a must if we are to remain a free republic.
It’s time for a change! Vote Democrat in November.
Blog on!
Wild Bill
Friday, August 25, 2006
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